An Aggregated Information Technology Checklist for Operational Risk Management by Mehmet Zeki Önal
BDDK Bankac›l›k ve Finansal Piyasalar
Cilt: 1, Say›: 2, 2007
An Aggregated Information Technology
Checklist for Operational 
Risk Management





This study addresses the issue of the Information Technology (IT) Governance fra-
meworks and standards that respond to different levels of operational risks, especially
those caused by the information systems and technology infrastructure. A require-
ment analysis regarding Basel II is conducted, a gap analysis between the Information
Control Models (ICMs) is performed, and the aggregated IT checklist for Operational
Risk Management (ORM) is proposed by mapping the control objectives in ICMs to
the operational risk categories described in Basel II as loss event types. The validity and
reliability of the study is based on the focus group assessment of the mappings.  
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Özet - Operasyonel Risk Yönetimi ‹çin Bütünleﬂtirilmiﬂ Bilgi Teknolojileri 
Kontrol Listesi
Bu çal›ﬂma, Bilgi Teknolojileri (BT) Yönetiﬂim çerçevesi ve standartlar›n›n, özellik-
le bilgi sistemleri ve teknolojileri altyap›s›ndan kaynaklanan farkl› seviyelerdeki ope-
rasyonel risklere cevap vermeleri sorununu vurgulamaktad›r. Basel II ba¤lam›nda bir
gereksinim analizi yap›lm›ﬂ, Bilgi Kontrol Modelleri (BKM) aras›nda bir farkl›l›k anali-
zi gerçekleﬂtirilmiﬂ ve Basel II’de zarar olay tipleri olarak aç›klanan operasyonel risk
kategorilerinin BKM’lerdeki kontrol hedeflerine eﬂleﬂtirilmesi ile Operasyonel Risk Yö-
netimi (ORY) için bütünleﬂtirilmiﬂ BT kontrol listesi önerilmiﬂtir. Çal›ﬂman›n geçerlili¤i
ve güvenilirli¤i, eﬂleﬂtirmeler üzerinde yap›lm›ﬂ olan grup de¤erlendirmesine dayan-
d›r›lm›ﬂt›r.      
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491. Introduction
The business environment is becoming more technologically powered and comp-
lex at each heartbeat. New risks and threats are being faced, the needs must be ma-
naged, and new opportunities are waiting to be tapped. Operational risk is one of
the most significant risks that businesses face in today’s complex global economy
(Samad-Khan, 2005). For most of the world’s leading institutions, it has become mo-
re than apparent that implementing an effective Operational Risk Management
(ORM) program can help reduce losses, lower costs associated with fixing problems
and increase customer and employee satisfaction, thereby improving financial per-
formance and enhancing shareholder value.
All these changes require and produce new regulations for framing and control-
ling the environment, such as the Basel II capital allocation framework, which requi-
res many actions at different levels in an organization. Basel II has forced banks to
review their approach to managing operational risk since it has been effective from
January 1st, 2007 in European countries. In addition, the Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency (BRSA) in Turkey announced that the Basel II regulations for the
Turkish banking sector will be effective from January 1st, 2009.
However, the methodologies, frameworks, or standards to be referred to as ba-
seline during the ORM regarding the effectiveness of the internal systems have not
been discussed in Basel II. Basel II and other regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley, Law
for Security Exchange Commission (SEC) in the USA, and European Directives do not
prescribe actual technologies to use for compliance although they give guidance on
the implementation of an effective ORM in order to allow local regulators adopting
their methodologies. In accordance with this approach, Kane (2001) argues that in-
ternational regulatory standards are inferior to competition among national regula-
tory systems, especially in strengthening the banking systems in developing countri-
es. Goldstein (2001) is much more positive about the potential for value-increasing
international regulatory standards, especially if flexibility is built into the standards
and if the international standards do not reach down into all aspects of the financi-
al system. Therefore, most organizations adopt internal control frameworks as mo-
dels of best practice for compliance where the most common element of all regula-
tions is a strong set of internal controls (Davidson, 2006).
Responding the need of ORM related to operational risks caused by Information
Technology (IT) processes, the Information Technology Governance Institute (ITGI)
published the document entitled “Information Technology Control Objectives for Ba-
sel II” in October 2007 (ITGI, 2007b) which refers to the Control Objectives for In-
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refore, the aim of this paper is to assess whether IT Governance frameworks and
standards (Information Control Models) are appropriate at the control objective le-
vel for controlling the operational risks, and to integrate and harmonize them in or-
der to project an aggregated IT checklist for ORM. In the article, the control objec-
tives in Information Control Models (ICMs) have been evaluated and mapped to the
operational risk categories in Basel II which are defined as loss event types, rather
than bridging the Basel II principles and CobiT principles, so that the ICMs can be
compared against the Basel II requirements’ fulfillment.
For such an assessment, following ICMs have been analyzed regarding the Basel
II requirements related to ORM:
• CobiT 4th edition (ITGI, 2005),
• Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) version 2 (OGC, 2004),
• ISO27002:2005 - ISO17799:2005 (BS7799) (BSI, 1999),
• ISO27001:2005 (ISO27001) (ISO, 2005),
• Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) Enterprise Risk Management
(ERM) Integrated Framework (COSO, 2004).
In order to be able to propose a sophisticated IT checklist, the following sections
discuss the various definitions of risk, control, operational risk, risk management and
measurement, and ORM, in the lights of Basel II ORM requirements and other US
and European regulations. Then, Basel II operational risk categories and control ob-
jectives in the ICMs are mapped, and the mappings are evaluated by a focus group.
Lastly, the aggregated IT checklist for ORM is proposed, which is a best practices
approach based on CobiT and structured on COSO. However, the organizations sho-
uld consider that the aggregated IT checklist for ORM is a framework which sup-
ports the whole ORM activities in the organization by excelling the IT related pro-
cesses and controls in the core IT systems and technologies including the ones used
for ORM itself, for example while collecting loss data and calculating the ratios re-
quired by Basel II. Thus, the checklist should be considered as a viable part of the
ORM and hence corporate governance by sustaining the IT structure.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Operational Risk Management
The term risk is used universally, but different audiences often attach slightly different
meanings to it (Kloman, 1990). Although there are many variations in how risk is defined,
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(Dorofee, 1996). This definition includes two key aspects of risk: (1) some loss must be pos-
sible and (2) there must be uncertainty associated with that loss. Thus, risk is subdivided in-
to two types: speculative risks and hazard risks (Young, 2001). With speculative risk, you
can realize a gain, improving your current situation relative to the status quo. At the same
time, you have the potential to experience a loss. In contrast, hazard risk only has potenti-
al losses associated with it and provides no opportunity to improve the current situation.
All forms of risk comprise common elements (Alberts, 2006). These four basic compo-
nents of risk are: (1) context, (2) action, (3) conditions, and (4) consequence. Context is the
background, situation, or environment in which risk is being viewed and defines which ac-
tions and conditions are relevant to that situation. The action is the act or occurrence that
triggers risk. Whereas the action is the active component of risk, conditions constitute risk’s
passive element. They are defined as the current state or the set of circumstances that can
lead to risk. Conditions, when combined with a specific triggering action, can produce a
set of consequences, or outcomes. Consequences, the final element of risk, are the poten-
tial results or effects of an action in combination with a specific condition(s).
Figure 1 illustrates how the four elements of risk are translated to operational risk and
shows the relationships between controls, triggers and vulnerabilities, and impacts (Alberts,
2006). Controls are the circumstances that propel a process toward fulfilling its mission.
They include the policies, procedures, practices, conditions, and organizational structures
designed to provide reasonable assurance that a mission will be achieved and that undesi-
red events will be prevented, detected, and corrected (ITGI, 2005). Controls can help redu-
ce risk by eliminating a triggering event, monitoring for the occurrence of a trigger and
implementing contingency plans when appropriate, reducing vulnerability, and reducing
potential impacts.
King (2001) defines operational risk as the risk not related to the way a firm finances
its business, but rather to the way a firm operates its business. He offers an alternative de-
finition: operational risk is a measure of the link between a firm’s business activities and the
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Figure 1: Controls and Operational Riskvariation in its business results. When the Bankers Trust began its study of operational risks
in the early 90’s, their definition of operational risks (Hoffman, 2002) was more or less
“everything which is not market or credit risk”. They decided to define some risk classes
such as people, relationship, technology and processing, physical, and other external risks.
In addition, Saunders (2000) advocates that the internal sources of the operational risk are
employees, technology, customer relationships and capital assets destruction, as the exter-
nal sources are mainly fraud and natural disasters.
Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed inter-
nal processes, people and systems or from external events, resulted from an industry study
performed by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), the International Swaps and Derivati-
ves Association (ISDA), Risk Management Association (RMA), and PricewaterhouseCoo-
pers (PwC) in 1999 (BBA, ISDA, RMA & PwC, 1999), as affirmed in Basel II (Basel Commit-
tee, 2004) and referred by Netter & Poulsen (2005). Beyond the rules and the modeling
requirements for measuring the regulatory capital required to cover operational risk pro-
perly, the Basel Committee acknowledges a particular attention to the management of this
risk by illustrating this concern in the document entitled “Sound Practices for the Manage-
ment and Supervision of Operational Risk” published by the Bank for International Settle-
ment (BIS) in 2002 referring Basel I (Chapelle, 2005b).
In addition, BRSA (2001) describes the operational risk as the risk of loss arising from
errors and omissions caused by breakdowns in the internal controls of the bank, the failu-
re of the bank management and personnel to perform in a timely manner, or mistakes ma-
de by the bank management, or breakdowns and failures in the IT system, and events such
as major earthquake, major fire or flood. As seen in the definition, the operational risk is
detailed by BRSA considering the possible effects of IT processes and controls on the busi-
ness operations and the trigger effect of the operational risk on other risks such as busi-
ness risks. BRSA (2006a) lists examples such as that AT&T has experienced a main switch
problem in 1998 where many credit cards were out of function for over 18 hours and Imar
Bank has built a fraudulent double booking system in 2003, for the operational failures and
frauds based on IT. BRSA (2006b) has also published the Regulation on Information
Systems Assurance in the Banks for assurance of the information systems. The regulation
refers (BRSA, 2006b) to CobiT framework while assuring the IT infrastructure of the banks,
and requires that the periodic IT audits including the IT based applications controls within
the banking business processes are performed beginning from 2007.
Moreover, the attention has shifted towards the risk management of operational risk
because of that events due to operational risk can have a devastating impact on the ope-
53 An Aggregated Information Technology Checklist for Operational Risk Managementrations of banks. Famous cases are Barings’ insolvency, the Allied Irish Banks’ loss of 750
million dollars due to rogue trading, and the 2 billion dollars settlement of class action law-
suit against Prudential Insurance due to fraudulent sales practices over 13 year (Mürmann
& Öktem, 2002). Thus, operational risk has become an important part of financial institu-
tion risk management efforts partly because it was highlighted by the Basel Committee
and Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley, and because of the disruptions associated with the
September 11 attacks. Though some still doubt whether it is material or even can be me-
asured, financial institutions increasingly allocate capital to operational risk. For instance, a
survey by Oliver Wyman and Company of ten large international banks found that they al-
locate 53% of their economic capital to credit risk, 21% to market risk and asset-liability ra-
te risks, and 26% to operational and other risks (Carey & Stulz, 2005).
2.2. Basel II and Operational Risk Categories
The fundamental objective of the Basel Committee while revising the 1988 Basel
Accord and publishing the Basel II, has been defined as to develop a framework that
would further strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking
system while maintaining sufficient consistency that capital adequacy regulation will
not be a significant source of competitive inequality among internationally active
banks (Basel Committee, 2004). Since the purpose of Basel II was to enhance the
way banks cover and manage their risks, the first pillar presents the calculation of
the total minimum capital requirements for credit, market, and operational risk (Ba-
sel Committee, 2004).
For the purposes of internal ORM, the banks must identify all material operatio-
nal risk losses consistent with the scope of the definition of operational risk and the
loss event including those related to credit risk (Basel Committee, 2004). In additi-
on, the Basel Committee (2004) notes that internal loss data is most relevant when
it is clearly linked to a bank’s current business activities, technological processes and
risk management procedures, and defines seven loss event types. Table 1 (RMG,
2002) represents QIS2 results which detail the operational risk loss information that
the 30 contributing banks were able to supply according to the loss event types (Ba-
sel Committee, 2004).
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Table 1: Frequency Severity Matrix for Basel II Loss Event Types (in percentages)Considering that the technology is seen as one of the internal sources of opera-
tional risk by Saunders (2000), that BRSA’s (2001) operational risk definition
includes the breakdowns and failures in the IT system or any other events which
may cause these disruptions, that Hoffman’s (2002) definition of operational risks is
more or less everything that is not market or credit risk, and the factors that lead
the operational risks mentioned above, IT processes and controls are the basic trig-
gers and vulnerabilities which produce the operational risks. These threats are the
circumstances that create the potential for harm or loss. Since the operational risk
looks into the future, focusing on problems and failures that have not yet occurred,
while a problem describes a situation that is presently taking place (Alberts &
Dorofee, 2005), the loss event types defined in Basel II are named as operational
risk categories because of their natures.
2.3. Information Control Models
These regulations, definitions and attitudes published by Bank for International
Settlement (BIS), Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), and other sta-
keholders lead us to answer whether current ICMs are applicable for controlling the
operational risks defined in Basel II. The organizations are increasingly exposed to
various operational risks related to the use of IT since IT is now intrinsic to and per-
vasive within enterprises (ISACA, 2006), e.g. virus attacks, unauthorized access to
data, breakdown of infrastructure, system and infrastructure contingency, perfor-
mance problems. In order to prevent such risks efficiently, the banks are forced to
identify, analyze and valuate potential IT related operational risks. They should imp-
lement appropriate IT Governance (Jochum, 2006) in order to provide a controlled
IT framework to the business processes since IT Governance enables an organizati-
on to attain three vital objectives: regulatory and legal compliance, operational ex-
cellence, and risk optimization.
The organizations can ease their venture into IT Governance that ensures that
the enterprise’s IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategies and objectives
(ITGI, 2005), by leveraging various industry standard frameworks. Champbell (2003)
categorizes over fifty  ICMs under following subcategories: control objectives com-
munities, principles communities, capability maturity communities, checklists, risk
management frameworks, and taxonomies. Most frameworks provide requisite sup-
port materials in the form of roadmaps, guides, templates, libraries, and samples.
While these are not turn-key methodologies that will embed IT Governance into the
organization, the frameworks provide a foundation for creating a governance struc-
ture. Therefore, the organizations are arguing to harmonize and integrate the lea-
ding frameworks to achieve greater compatibility. The ICMs covered in this study, the-
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ted in Table 2.
3. Methodology
3.1. Basel II Requirement Analysis
The improvement of banks’ ORM frameworks concerns new requirements ad-
dressed in Basel II (Di Renzo & Bernard, 2005). The main sources for the require-
ment analysis are the publications of the Basel Committee: Basel II (Basel Commit-
tee, 2004), and a document entitled “Sound Practices for the Management and Su-
pervision of Operational Risk” (Basel Committee, 2003a). Other important sources
were the workshops organized and the documents published by the Basel Commit-
tee (2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b, 2004)
where supervisors described their expectations from banks’ ORM framework and
the assessments’ organizational constraints. Then, the descriptions of ICMs and
ORM methods and good practices, including loss data analyses, were used. Finally,
the articles and case studies structured on the operational failures of the compani-
es were read and interpreted.
Three approaches are proposed in Basel II for the calculation of minimum capi-
tal requirements for operational risk: The basic indicator approach (BIA), the stan-
dardized approach (SA), and the advanced measurement approach (AMA). So, the
requirements were structured along those three approaches. For instance, the requ-
irement that as part of the bank’s internal risk assessment system, the bank must
systematically track relevant operational risk data including material losses by busi-
ness lines (Basel Committee, 2004) is essential to the SA. Moreover, these approac-
hes are ranked in increasing order of sophistication. The more advanced approach
encompasses the requirements of the less sophisticated approaches. This structure
has been adopted for the definition of the categories of requirements. For instan-
ce, if a bank adopts an AMA, it will have to meet the following requirement: Any
internal risk measurement system must be consistent with the loss event types (Ba-
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Table 2: Information Control Modelssel Committee, 2004) in addition to the requirement given above for the SA. This
implies a commitment to continuous improvement of ORM, and associated ORM
processes, across the organization.
The structure of risk management activities can also be gathered from the requ-
irements. For instance, the requirement that the ORM function must be responsib-
le for developing strategies to identify, assess, monitor, and control/mitigate opera-
tional risk (Basel Committee, 2004), indicates activities composing the management
of risks. Some requirements refer to a clear assignment of responsibilities and aut-
horities, such as the requirement that the bank must have techniques for creating
incentives to improve the management of operational risk throughout the firm (Ba-
sel Committee, 2004). This example shows that financial and managerial incentives
must be used in order to ensure that each bank employee contributes to the impro-
vement of the operational risk management framework.
Since Basel II requires a supervisory review process including the assessment of
the control environment, it is also required that supervisors should consider the qua-
lity of the bank’s management information reporting and systems, the manner in
which business risks and activities are aggregated, and the management’s record in
responding to emerging or changing risks (Basel Committee, 2004). In addition, Ba-
sel II requires that banks should have clear and effective policies, procedures, and
information systems to monitor compliance (Basel Committee, 2004), that supervi-
sors should develop detailed review procedures to ensure that banks’ systems and
controls are adequate to serve (Basel Committee, 2004), and that management
must also ensure, on an ongoing basis, that the rating system is operating properly
(Basel Committee, 2004). These requirements show that the banks should have a
sound ORM structure, and IT related operational risks should be covered in a com-
prehensive way.
In addition to Basel II itself, ITGI published the document entitled “Information
Technology Control Objectives for Basel II” in October 2007 (ITGI, 2007b). ITGI
(2007b) is taking the proactive step of addressing risk in financial service organiza-
tions considering that information risk and information technology have become de-
cisive factors in shaping modern business, and many financial service organizations
have undergone a fundamental transformation in terms of IT infrastructures, appli-
cations, and IT related internal controls. Since IT related components such as appli-
cations, infrastructure elements and controls are all defined as parts of operational
risk, ITGI (2007b) maps Basel II principles for operational risk against information
technology risk.
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risk management, where these guiding principles correspond to the principles of
ORM as set down in Basel II, and where these risks are related to IT scenarios and
controls. These guiding principles are structured by ITGI (2007b) considering Basel
II principles and their IT relevance and requirements. Thus, the requirements in Basel
II and their impacts on IT are evaluated and a corporate governance, risk manage-
ment, and regulatory compliance (GRC) framework is established. The core Basel II
principles are listed as follows:
1. Board of directors should be aware of the need for an operational risk man-
agement framework.
2. Operational risk management framework is subject to effective and compre-
hensive internal audit.
3. Develop policies, processes and procedures for managing operational risk.
4. Identify and assess the operational risk.
5. Regularly monitor operational risk profiles and material exposures to losses.
6. Have policies, processes and procedures to control and/or mitigate material
operational risks.
7. Have contingency and business continuity plans.
8. Have framework in place to identify, assess, monitor and control/ mitigate
material operational risks.
9. Conduct regular independent evaluation of a bank’s policies, procedures and
practices related to operational risks.
10. Sufficient public disclosure.
ITGI (2007b) refers to the CobiT framework at sub-domain level by bridging the
Basel II principles and CobiT principles, rather than to the control objective level. In
addition, ITGI (2007b) builds an ORM framework, which sets the principles and
guides the stakeholders rather than proposing a new ICM for ORM. Instead ITGI
(2007b) brings the concepts of risk management, corporate and IT Governance,
ICMs, and related regulations, and highlights the importance of GRC. Considering
the requirements defined in Basel II in order to have a sound ORM structure, and
the control objectives published by ITGI (2007b) in order to have a sound GRC, the
organizations should have a comprehensive IT structure which covers all IT systems
and technologies and their components which could cause operational risks and
hence have impact on financial statements, including also the IT systems for ORM
itself. Therefore, an aggregated IT checklist for ORM is proposed in the following
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detailed.
3.2. Mapping Information Control Models to Operational Risks
In order to assess the ICMs regarding their ability to cover the operational risks
caused by the IT related processes, each and every control objective in ICMs, which
are covered in this study, have been mapped to the seven loss event types defined
in Basel II (Basel Committee, 2004), which are also operational risk categories (Basel
Committee, 2004). In the same way, each and every control objective in ICMs have
been mapped to the three control types defined by ITGI (2005): preventive, detec-
tive, and corrective. In order to be able to scale the contribution level of each ICM
and the penetration level of each control objective smoothly, one-to-one mapping
has been performed. However, one-to-one mapping caused an underestimation of
the secondary mapping alternatives since control objectives may have an impact on
other operational risk categories and additionally on different control types.
While mapping the control objectives, their nature is considered. For example, a
control objective may be attained by applying preventive, detective or corrective
control at different levels and steps of a process. However, the goal of the control
objective is used as the motivation on which the mapping is based, e.g. if the con-
trol objective is about monitoring a process, it is mapped to a detective control. In
the same way, a control objective may cover the internal fraud or external fraud risk.
However, the prior objective of the control objective is used as the motivation on
which the mapping is based, e.g. if the control objective is about access rights, it is
mapped to internal fraud, rather than considering the access rights of the third par-
ties, since there are different objectives related to relationships with third parties.
Therefore, the loss event type activities exampled in Basel II have been extended
in order to cover the context, domains, controls and IT based activities in ICMs so
that a guideline for mapping is prepared. Thus, possible operational risks caused by
the IT related processes and controls have been exampled. For loss event types, the
following activities have been added:
• Internal Fraud: Roles and responsibilities, segregation of duties, data owners-
hip, user account and identity management, promotion to production, log-
ging mechanism.
• External Fraud: Contracted staff security, external network security, external
network connections, and exchange of data.
• Employment Practices and Workplace Safety: Organizational structure, staf-
fing, competencies, staff evaluation, training.
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control environment, IT strategy and business practices alignment, IT risk ma-
nagement, IT supervisory and advisory boards, IT budgeting, enterprise IT mo-
dels (business / technical requirements), portfolio management, value mana-
gement and delivery, resource management, database management, data
classification, data confidentiality.
• Damage to Physical Assets: Site selection and layout, external facilities, offsi-
te storage, media library management, access to physical assets and sensitive
documents, disposal.
• Business Disruption and System Failures: Disaster Recovery Plan, Business Con-
tinuity Plan, configuration, infrastructure, incident, problem and change ma-
nagement, service desk, development activities, release and distribution, up-
date and upgrade, testing, back-up and recovery.
• Execution, Delivery & Process Management: Service Level Agreements, perfor-
mance monitoring, key personnel, scheduling, reporting, data integrity, data
processing.
3.3. Focus Group Assessment
While mapping the control objectives of CobiT to the operational risk categories
in Basel II, a workshop has been organized in order to ensure the reliability of the
study. External IT auditors from consultancy services, internal auditors from the bu-
siness world, and professionals from academic institutions participated in the work-
shop and served as judges by assessing the proposed mappings between the con-
trol objectives in CobiT, operational risk categories and control types. The focus gro-
up assessed the CobiT and Basel II mapping which had been proposed before the
workshop. Thus, the focus group increased the validity and reliability of the study
since the mappings are based on subjective appraisals.
In order to be able to assess the mappings, the focus group was informed abo-
ut the operational risk categories, the loss event type examples based on IT, and the
control types with an invitation letter before the workshop and with a presentation
during the workshop. Thus, the focus group had a common understanding of the
concepts covered in the aggregated IT checklist.
During the workshop, the focus group discussed each control objective in CobiT
and accepted the mapping or rejected it and proposed a new mapping. The control
objectives were ordered according to the operational risk categories proposed, and
discussed in this order. Therefore, the participants had a wider view of the context
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control objectives in a specific operational risk category. Additionally, the partici-
pants were requested to write down their choice of mappings on the set of docu-
ments as evidence.
Table 3 summarizes the differences between the proposed mappings and the fo-
cus group assessment results in each operational risk category and control type
where applicable.
Table 4 presents the consensus within the focus group while mapping the con-
trol objectives in CobiT with the decision of the majority or unanimous agreement.
The results show us that the focus group generally reached a consensus, especially
for the security related issues such as internal fraud, external fraud and damage to
physical assets. Since there was a discussion on the IT activities regarding business
continuity, whether it should be categorized under business disruption and system
failures or execution, delivery & process management, the consensus on these are-
as are lower than the others. There are seventeen control objectives where the fo-
cus group made a majority decision and 198 control objectives where the focus gro-
up was unanimous in its decision while mapping the control objectives in CobiT.
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Table 3: Differences between Proposed Mappings and Workshop Results3.4. Gap Analysis
Using the mapping results for CobiT’s control objectives, performed during the
workshop and mappings between CobiT and other ICMs (ITGI, 2006a and ITGI,
2007a), control objectives in BS7799, ISO27001, ITIL and COSO have been mapped
to the operational risk categories and control types. As a result, a gap analysis
between ICMs is done by calculating the contribution and penetration levels of each
ICM in each operational risk category and control type.
The contribution level is the percentage of the control objectives in an ICM ded-
icated to a specific operational risk category in Basel II, considering all control objec-
tives in that ICM. The contribution level indicates how many control objectives in an
ICM are covering which operational risk category in Basel II. The penetration level is
the percentage of the control objectives in an ICM, dedicated to a specific opera-
tional risk category in Basel II and to a specific control type, considering all control
objectives in that ICM. The penetration level indicates how many control objectives
in an ICM are covering which operational risk category in Basel II and in which
nature. It is possible to understand which ICM focuses on which operational risk cat-
egory by interpreting the contribution level. It is possible to understand which ICM
focuses on which operational risk category and in which nature of control by inter-
preting the penetration level.
After mapping the control objectives in ICMs to the operational risk categories
and control types, the contribution level of each ICM for each operational risk cate-
gory has been calculated using the following formula (1):
CLICM = COR / COTICM *100 as (1)
62 Mehmet Zeki Önal
Table 4: Workshop Consensus ResultsCLICM: Contribution Level of ICM for the Operational Risk Category
COR: Number of Control Objectives in ICM mapped to the Operational Risk
Category
COTICM: Total Number of Control Objectives in ICM.
In the same way, the penetration level of each ICM for each operational risk cat-
egory and each control type has been calculated using the following formula (2):
PLICM = CORT / COTICM *100 as  (2)
PLICM: Penetration Level of ICM for the Operational Risk Category and Control Type
CORT: Number of Control Objectives in ICM mapped to the Operational Risk
Category and Control Type
COTICM: Total Number of Control Objectives in ICM.
4. Findings
4.1. Contribution and Penetration Levels of Information Control
Models
The contribution and penetration levels of each ICM are presented in Table 5.
These levels show us the characteristics of the control objectives in ICMs consider-
ing the operational risk categories and control types. The table points out that the
ICMs have mostly preventive control objectives rather than detective and corrective
control objectives, e.g. there are no corrective controls for external fraud or dam-
age to physical assets risk categories. These results, the existence of preventive con-
trol objectives rather than detective and corrective, are in accordance with the
natures of the ICMs since they are based on the control objectives in order to cover
the related risks and build a control environment.
The Table 5 shows us that CobiT is the best practice regarding the Employment
Practices and Workplace Safety, Clients, Products & Business Practices, and
Execution, Delivery & Process Management operational risk categories if we consid-
er that COSO is a risk management framework rather than an IT Governance stan-
dard. ISO27001 is the best practice regarding the Internal Fraud and Damage to
Physical Assets operational risk categories. BS7799 is the best practice regarding
External Fraud, and ITIL is the best practice regarding the Business Disruption and
System Failures operational risk category. As a result, the results are in line with the
nature of ICM since BS7799 and ISO27001 focus on security and ITIL focuses on
change management, availability management, and problem management. In gen-
erally, Employment Practices and Workplace Safety operational risk category is not
covered with a high contribution level as other operational risk categories. Other
categories are covered in different levels by different ICMs.
63 An Aggregated Information Technology Checklist for Operational Risk ManagementAs shown in Table 5, COSO concentrated on the business practices, process man-
agement and business disruption. Therefore, COSO (COSO, 2004) emphasizes the
responsibilities of management for control, and the key principles for creating an
effective risk management process, in order to help businesses and other entities to
assess and enhance their internal control systems. Thus, awareness of the manage-
ment about the internal control environment can be achieved.
CobiT focuses on the employment practices, business practices and process man-
agement, as it is an IT Governance framework and has control objectives designed
for support and delivery of IT services. CobiT covers the operational risks related to
employment practices, business practices and process management considering
that it has comprehensive control objectives for planning and organizing IT activi-
ties, acquiring and implementing IT systems and technologies, delivering and sup-
porting the IT services, and monitoring and evaluating the IT structure as in its
domains. Thus, overall execution of IT processes, ongoing improvement on the
process management, employee and business practices, and IT’s delivery of value to
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the business can be achieved. On the other hand, CobiT does not detail the securi-
ty related control objectives and hence does not cover the operational risks related
to the internal and external fraud. Physical security is not detailed by CobiT since it
contains generic control objectives related to security aspects. If the secondary con-
tribution of CobiT is evaluated, the facts show that CobiT has a high contribution
on the operational risks related to business disruptions since it is a part of IT
Governance.
BS7799 and ISO27001 have similar contribution and penetration levels since they
are security standards, and ISO27001 has been developed using BS7799. Therefore,
they have higher contribution and penetration levels especially for internal and
external frauds, and damage to physical assets. These security standards cover the
operational risks related to internal and external frauds, and damage to physical
assets considering that they have comprehensive control objectives for logical secu-
rity including the user account management, physical security, network security,
security aspects of system development and maintenance. Thus, unauthorized activ-
ities and unauthorized access to the physical and logical systems from internal and
external sources can be prevented. On the other hand, these ICMs do not have com-
prehensive control objectives related to IT Governance and business disruptions
since they detail and concentrate on the logical and physical security aspects of an
organization. If the secondary contributions of these ICMs are evaluated, the facts
show these ICMs have high contributions on the operational risks related to work-
place safety since it can also be considered as a security aspect of the business.
ITIL concentrates on the business disruptions since it has specific domains relat-
ed to incident, problem, availability and change management. ITIL covers the oper-
ational risks related to business disruptions considering that it has comprehensive
control objectives for infrastructure management, capacity management, availabili-
ty management, incident management, problem management, change manage-
ment and release management. Thus, hardware, software, telecommunications,
and utility outages/disruptions can be prevented. On the other hand, ITIL does not
have any security related control objectives. If the secondary contribution of ITIL is
evaluated, the facts show that ITIL has a high contribution on the operational risks
related to IT Governance since it also includes the risk appetite of an organization
regarding the business disruptions.
Considering that the ICMs covered in this study are assessed according to the
contribution and penetration levels on operational risk categories regarding the IT
processes and controls, they are not assessed regarding the other sources of oper-
ational risks.66 Mehmet Zeki Önal
4.2. Best Practices Approach Based on CobiT
The gap analysis between the ICMs and the workshop results lead us to recom-
mend an aggregated IT checklist for ORM since the ICMs covered in this study con-
tribute to the operational risk categories at different levels and penetrate into them
in different natures considering the control types. Although the importance of IT
controls is embedded in the COSO internal control framework, IT management re-
quires more examples to help identify, document and evaluate IT controls (ITGI,
2004). In addition, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the regu-
latory body established by US legislators to oversee companies’ (and auditors’)
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley, recommends the COSO framework as a mini-
mum standard (Datardina, 2005). Therefore, we recommend that COSO to be imp-
lemented as a starting point by each organization in order to enable the manage-
ment of operational risks, because COSO is a risk management framework, and
companies are starting to move away from considering their risks in isolation, and
are looking beyond the traditional hazard and financial risk towards strategic and
operational risks (GIRO, 2002).
The COSO approach refers to ERM, which has been viewed as the management
of business risk, financial risk, operational risk and risk transfer to maximize a firm's
value to owners and customers (Norris & Young, 2005). Risk transfer is the exchan-
ge of the unknown financial impact of specified events to a third party for a known
financial cost through insurance or securitization (Dowd, 2001). Finally, COSO
(2004) itself defines ERM as a process, affected by an entity’s board of directors,
management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enter-
prise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage
risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the ac-
hievement of entity objectives.
In addition to COSO, the CobiT IT Governance framework is recommended as a
baseline since effective IT Governance requires control over IT processes (Payne,
2003) as in CobiT, considering that IT processes cover the setting of objectives, gi-
ving directions on how to attain objectives and measuring performance in comple-
ting these activities (Korac-Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2001). To improve the overall
performance of IT and reduce the failure caused by inappropriate IT activities, the-
re is a need for careful design, planning, acquisition and implementation of IT to
manage its various activities and risks (Beaumaster, 2002 & Hardy, 2002). It is im-
portant to properly manage IT resources through a set of IT processes that providethe information which the enterprise needs to achieve its objectives (Payne, 2003).
CobiT is based on international best practices from various countries, including the
United States of America, Europe, Australia, Canada and Japan; therefore, it serves
as a more than appropriate framework on which the comparative framework can
be based (Bornman & Labuschagne, 2006). Moreover, CobiT has been regularly ac-
cepted and applied by the Turkish banks since 2006 (BRSA, 2006b), and aligns with
the spirit of the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement that any framework used be open and
generally acceptable (ITGI, 2004). As a result, CobiT bridges the gaps between bu-
siness risks, control needs, and technical issues. Therefore, it is recommended that
CobiT should be a baseline although it is not best practice for each operational risk
category in Basel II, referring to that Hardy (1995) defines CobiT as a common fra-
mework, which is cumulative instead of exclusive and based on forty-one primary
reference materials. Since CobiT is a pervasive ICM, it should be used as a baseline
in order to ensure that the organizations have a solid and strong IT governance
structure. Hence, other ICMs can easily be adopted in order to improve the related
IT related business processes by applying the ICMs in a holistic way, e.g. ICMs for
IT risk management, project management, service management, security, system
development, change management, service development, etc.
Therefore, it is recommended that the additional control objectives derived from
each best practice ICM for each operational risk category should be aggregated
with CobiT, where CobiT is not best practice ICM according to the gap analysis per-
formed. While determining the additional control objectives, control objectives as-
signed to operational risk categories in CobiT have been mapped to the control ob-
jectives in each best practice ICM for each operational risk category. Thus, only dif-
ferent control objectives have been added and the overlapping of control objectives
has been avoided.
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Table 6: Aggregated IT Checklist for Operational Risk ManagementTable 6 shows us the structure of the aggregated IT checklist for ORM. Although
COSO is best practice considering the Employment Practices and Workplace Safety,
and Clients, Products & Business Practices operational risk categories, CobiT is con-
sidered as best practice in these areas since COSO is recommended as a starting po-
int of risk management. For Employment Practices and Workplace Safety, Clients,
Products & Business Practices and Execution, Delivery & Process Management, the
control objectives of CobiT are appropriate to cover operational risks in these areas.
Therefore, there is no need for additional control objectives. For Internal Fraud,
twenty-seven additional control objectives from ISO27001 are required in order to
able to cover operational risks in this area. In the same way, for External Fraud, fif-
teen additional control objectives from BS7799 are required, for Damage to Physi-
cal Assets, twelve additional control objectives from ISO27001 are required, and for
Business Disruption and System Failures, twenty-nine additional control objectives
from ITIL are required. Therefore, additional control objectives should be determi-
ned according to the needs and priorities of the organizations, considering which
operational risk category should be excelled. These objectives should be in accordan-
ce with the control objectives of COSO and CobiT, if they are used as a baseline, in
order to ensure that the aggregated IT checklist for ORM is a comprehensive check-
list and have control objectives in similar context. Thus, additional control objectives
should be considered as control objectives which detail the roadmap of the organi-
zation in order to have a higher degree of comfort in a specific operational risk ca-
tegory.
As a result, COSO and CobiT serve as the starting point of the aggregated IT
checklist for ORM since CobiT relates to COSO at a broad level and it is relatively
simple to combine COSO with CobiT at a conceptual level (Panko, 2006). The con-
ceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Best practices approach based on CobiTAs shown in Figure 2, the assessment of the operational risks categorized in Ba-
sel II is performed using a maturity model, which is derived from CobiT or Capabi-
lity Maturity Model Integration (CMMI). The control objectives in the aggregated IT
checklist for ORM are assessed using the maturity levels detailed in CobiT (ITGI,
2005) or in CMMI (SEI, 2002) as shown in Table 7.
This assessment will lead the organizations monitor the ORM activities, update
their ORM strategies, and improve their IT structure by evaluating the maturity of
the IT related processes and by evaluating the gap between the control objectives
in ICMs and their actual implementations in the organization. Maturity model res-
ponds to three needs: A relative measure of where the enterprise is, a manner to
efficiently decide where to go, and a tool for measuring progress against the goal.
5. Conclusion
As explained above, the aggregated IT checklist for ORM is a combined ICM,
which is based on COSO and CobiT and expanded using the control objectives from
BS7799, ISO27001, and ITIL where they are best practices in specific operational
risk category defined in Basel II. Since organizations may have different frequency
and severity matrices regarding each operational risk category, they have a chance
to apply the aggregated IT checklist as a whole or separately according to the eva-
luation of their loss data history by comparing the QIS2 results (RMG, 2002) or la-
ter researches and their prioritization of their loss data.
Therefore, it is important to determine which ICM(s) should be applied by the or-
ganizations according to their needs and priorities. The organizations should consi-
der that the aggregated IT checklist for ORM is a framework which supports the
whole ORM activities in the organization by excelling the IT related processes and
controls in the core IT systems and technologies which have impact on financial sta-
tements. While adopting the best practices approach based on CobiT, the organiza-
tions should concentrate on their needs and apply the best practices for their ope-
rations rather than harmonizing all ICMs or the control objectives in ICMs. Thus, the
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Table 7: Maturity Levelsorganizations can avoid the risk of getting lost in the control objectives detailed in
different levels in various ICMs, and hence concentrate on the governance structu-
res.
Accordingly, each organization should tailor an IT control approach suitable to
its size and complexity, considering the COSO ERM framework (ITGI, 2004), and
should develop its GRC (ITGI, 2007b). As a starting point, the organizations should
apply the COSO ERM framework and CobiT IT Governance framework in order to
be able to manage the operational risks caused by IT processes and controls. The
aggregated IT checklist for ORM, which is actually a best practices approach based
on CobiT, responds to Basel II ORM requirements by comparing the ICMs at the con-
trol objective level regarding their penetration and contribution levels to ORM, rat-
her than offering guidance for ORM steps. 
Operational risk managers and internal or external auditors can use this study as
an operational risk assessment tool by rating each control objective since Mc Con-
nell (2005) discusses such a measurement need. The assessment of the operational
risks categorized in Basel II is performed using a maturity model, which is derived
from CobiT. The control objectives in the aggregated IT checklist for ORM are asses-
sed using the maturity levels detailed in CobiT (ITGI, 2005) or in CMMI (SEI, 2002).
However, unless all IT systems or processes pose a high risk to the financial state-
ments, not all IT systems or processes need to be included or evaluated to the sa-
me extent. In performing a risk assessment, consideration needs to be given to in-
herent risk rather than residual risk, which is the risk left over after considering the
impact of controls (ITGI, 2006b).
For further research, a guideline for assessing the maturity levels of the control
objectives coming from CobiT and other ICMs can be prepared in order to evaluate
the maturity level of each control objective and to assess the ORM in an organizati-
on as a whole. In addition, other ICMs which have not been covered in this article
might be evaluated according to the operational risk categories in Basel II, conside-
ring that different IT processes need the guidance of various models specified in the-
se areas, e.g. Projects in Controlled Environments (PRINCE2) for project manage-
ment, CMMI-DEV for product and service development processes, CMMI-ACQ for
acquisition and outsourcing processes, IT Grundschutzhandbuch (IT Baseline Protec-
tion Manual) for a detailed security configuration. Since the ICMs discussed in this
study are updated according to the business world’s requirements, such as new edi-
tions of ICMs, where CobiT edition 4.1 has been published during the documenta-
tion of the study, the study should be revised and updated accordingly.
70 Mehmet Zeki ÖnalWith so much to do and so little time or resources, the operational risk mana-
gers need to prioritize the steps in ORM and apply the 80/20 rule (Lanz, 2002). By
focusing on and assigning resources to high-priority risks and exposures, operatio-
nal risk managers can cost-effectively mitigate risk to an acceptable level for their
enterprise. Independently from the methods and models employed during the ORM
process, organizations should not forget Hoffman’s (2002) statement: all the risk
management in the world cannot compensate for a flawed corporate vision and cul-
ture.
71 An Aggregated Information Technology Checklist for Operational Risk Management72 Mehmet Zeki Önal
References
1. Alberts, C. (2006). Common elements of risk. Pittsburgh: Software Engineering
Institute, Carnegie Mellon University.
2. Alberts, C. ve Dorofee, A. (2005). Mission assurance analysis protocol (MAAP):
Assessing risk in complex environments. Pittsburgh: Software Engineering Ins-
titute, Carnegie Mellon University.
3. Beaumaster, S. (2002). Local government IT implementation issues: a challen-
ge for public administration. Hawaii: Proceedings of Hawaii International Con-
ference on System Sciences.
4. Basel Committee. (2001a). The new Basel Capital Accord: an explanatory note.
Basel: The Bank for International Settlements.
5. Basel Committee. (2001b). Consultative document: operational risk. Basel: The
Bank for International Settlements.
6. Basel Committee. (2001c). Working paper on the regulatory treatment of ope-
rational risk. Basel: The Bank for International Settlements.
7. Basel Committee. (2001d). Sound practices for the management and supervisi-
on of operational risk. Basel: The Bank for International Settlements.
8. Basel Committee. (2002a). Sound practices for the management and supervisi-
on of operational risk. Basel: The Bank for International Settlements.
9. Basel Committee. (2002b). Overview paper for impact study. Basel: The Bank
for International Settlements.
10. Basel Committee. (2002c). About the Bank for International Settlements, Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel: The Bank for International Settlements.
11. Basel Committee. (2003a). Sound practices for the management and supervisi-
on of operational risk. Basel: The Bank for International Settlements.
12. Basel Committee. (2003b). The New Basel Capital Accord consultative docu-
ment. Basel: The Bank for International Settlements.
13. Basel Committee. (2004). International convergence of capital measurement
and capital standards: A Revised Framework. Basel: The Bank for International
Settlements.
14. BBA, ISDA, RMA ve PwC. (1999). Operational risk: the next frontier. Philadelp-
hia: British Bankers’ Association, the International Swaps and Derivatives Asso-
ciation, Risk Management Association, and PricewaterhouseCoopers.15. Bornman, W. G. ve Labuschagne, L. (2006). A comparative framework for eva-
luating information security risk management methods. Auckland Park: Rand
Afrikaans University.
16. BRSA. (2001). Regulation on banks’ internal control and risk management sys-
tems – Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency. Turkish Official Gazette, 8
February 2001, 24312.
17. BRSA. (2006a). An attitude of Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency for
IT assurance. Istanbul: IT Audit 2006 Workshops Proceedings.
18. BRSA. (2006b). Regulation on information systems assurance in the banks -
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency. Turkish Official Gazette, 16 May
2006, 26170.
19. BSI. (1999). British Standard: Information security management part1 & part2.
London: British Standards Institute Group (BSI).
20. Campbell, P. L. (2003). An introduction to information control models. New
Mexico: Sandia National Laboratories.
21. Carey, M. ve Stulz, R. M. (2005). The risks of financial institutions. Columbus:
Ohio State University Press.
22. Chapelle, A. (2005b). The virtues of operational risk management. Brussels:
Université Libre de Bruxelles.
23. COSO. (2004). Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework. Washing-
ton: The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO).
24. Datardina, M. (2005). Comparative analysis of IT control frameworks in the
context of SOX. Ontario: Centre for Information Systems Assurance, University
of Waterloo.
25. Davidson, S. (2006). The role of identity management: Moving from complian-
ce to improved business performance. New York: Computer Associates Inter-
national, Inc.
26. Di Renzo, B. ve Bernard, C. (2005). Operational risk management in financial
institutions: Process assessment in concordance with Basel II. Luxembourg:
Centre de Recherche Public Henri Tudor & Commission de Surveillance du Sec-
teur Financier.
27. Dorofee, A. J. (1996). Continuous risk management guidebook. Pittsburg: Soft-
ware Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University.
73 An Aggregated Information Technology Checklist for Operational Risk Management28. Dowd, W. (2001). Insurance of operational risk and the New Basel Capital Ac-
cord. Boston: Capital Allocation for Operational Risk Conference Proceedings.
29. Goldstein, M. (2001). Comment and discussion on relevance and the need for in-
ternational regulatory standards. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
30. Hardy, G. (1995). Standards - The need for a common framework. London: Pro-
ceedings of COMPSEC International 1995, 12th World Conference on Compu-
ter Security, Audit and Control.
31. Hardy, G. (2002). Make sure management and IT are on the same page: imp-
lementing an IT Governance framework. Information Systems Control Journal,
3, 14-16.
32. Hoffman, D.G. (2002). Managing operational risk: 20 firmwide best practice
strategies. New York: Wiley Frontiers in Finance, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
33. ISACA. (2006). CISA review manual 2007. Rolling Meadows: Information
Systems and Control Association (ISACA).
34. ISO. (2005). Information technology – Security techniques - Information secu-
rity management systems – Requirements. Geneva: International Organization
for Standardization (ISO).
35. ITGI. (2004). IT control objectives for Sarbanes-Oxley 1st edition: The Importance
of IT in the design, implementation and sustainability of internal control over disc-
losure and financial reporting. Rolling Meadows: IT Governance Institute (ITGI).
36. ITGI. (2005). COBIT® 4th edition. Rolling Meadows: IT Governance Institute
(ITGI).
37. ITGI. (2006a). COBIT® mapping: Mapping of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 with CO-
BIT® 4.0. Rolling Meadows: IT Governance Institute (ITGI).
38. ITGI. (2006b). IT control objectives for Sarbanes-Oxley 2nd edition: The impor-
tance of IT in the design, implementation and sustainability of internal control
over disclosure and financial reporting. Rolling Meadows: IT Governance Insti-
tute (ITGI).
39. ITGI. (2007a). COBIT® mapping: Mapping of ITIL® with COBIT® 4.0. Rolling
Meadows: IT Governance Institute (ITGI).
40. ITGI. (2007b). IT control objectives for Basel II: The importance of governance
and risk management for compliance. Rolling Meadows: IT Governance Institu-
te (ITGI).
74 Mehmet Zeki Önal41. Jochum, C. (2006). IT risk management in the banking industry. Frankfurt am
Main: Institut für Wirtschaftsinformatik.
42. Kane, E. J. (2001). Relevance and the need for international regulatory stan-
dards. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
43. King, J. L. (2001). Operational risk. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
44. Kloman, H. F. (1990). Risk management agonists. Risk Analysis, 10/2, 201-205.
45. Korac-Kakabadse, N. ve Kakabadse, A. (2001). IS/IT governance: need for an
integrated model. Corporate Governance, 1/4, 9-11.
46. Lanz, J. (2002). Prioritizing aspects of technology risk assessment and mitigati-
on. Bank Accounting & Finance, December 2002, 19-26.
47. Mc Connell, P. (2005). Measuring operational risk management systems under
Basel II. Sydney: Risk Trading Technology.
48. Mürmann, A. ve Öktem, Ü. (2002). The near-miss management of operational
risk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.
49. Netter, J. M. ve Poulsen, A. B. (2005). Operational risk in financial service providers
and the proposed Basel Capital Accord: An overview. Athens: University of Georgia.
50. Norris, V. A. ve Young, L. R. (2005). Risk assessment in Sarbanes-Oxley. Char-
leston: Advanced Technology Institute.
51. OGC. (2004). Information Technology Infrastructure Library v.2. Norwich: The
Office of Government Commerce (OGC).
52. Panko, R. R. (2006). Spreadsheets and Sarbanes-Oxley: Regulations, risks, and
control frameworks. Hawaii: University of Hawaii.
53. Payne, N. (2003). IT Governance and audit. Accountancy SA, January 2003, 35.
54. RMG. (2002). The quantitative impact study (QIS) for operational risk: Overvi-
ew of individual loss data and lessons learned: Report to Basel Committee. Ba-
sel: Risk Management Group, Bank for International Settlements.
55. Samad-Khan, A. (2005). Why COSO is flawed? Retrieved January 18, 2005,
from http://www.operationalriskonline.com
56. Saunders, A. (2000). Financial institutions management: A modern perspective.
New York: McGraw Hill.
57. SEI. (2002) Capability Maturity Model® Integration (CMMI), version 1.1. Pitt-
sburgh: Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University.
58. Young, P. C. ve Tippins, S. C. (2001). Managing business risk: An organization-wi-
de approach to risk management. New York: American Management Association.
75 An Aggregated Information Technology Checklist for Operational Risk Management